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Abstract
A large user base relies on software updates provided
through package managers. This provides a unique lever
for improving the security of the software update process.
We propose a transparency system for software updates
and implement it for a widely deployed Linux package
manager, namely APT. Our system is capable of detect-
ing targeted backdoors without producing overhead for
maintainers. In addition, in our system, the availability of
source code is ensured, the binding between source and
binary code is verified using reproducible builds, and the
maintainer responsible for distributing a specific package
can be identified. We describe a novel “hidden version”
attack against current software transparency systems and
propose as well as integrate a suitable defense. To ad-
dress equivocation attacks by the transparency log server,
we introduce tree root cross logging, where the log’s
Merkle tree root is submitted into a separately operated
log server. This significantly relaxes the inter-operator co-
operation requirements compared to other systems. Our
implementation is evaluated by replaying over 3000 up-
dates of the Debian operating system over the course of
two years, demonstrating its viability and identifying nu-
merous irregularities.
1 Introduction
Software systems require regular updates. The protection
of software distribution from manipulation is therefore
an integral part of computer security [1, 3, 4, 7, 13, 17,
18, 28, 30]. The attractiveness of using software updates
to distribute malware is evidenced by several recent at-
tacks piggybacking on legitimate software to target large
enterprises with backdoors [14, 16, 19].
Many systems rely on package-based software up-
daters to provide updates, such as installations of Linux
distributions. These distributions offer a central and col-
lectivized point of security updates. Many organizations,
unable to provide their own security support for software,
depend on the distributions for important updates. Due to
their central position, distributions consequently provide
an important lever for improving the security of software
dissemination. This distribution process poses a number
of challenges.
Package managers generally use cryptographic signa-
tures to protect the distribution of software packages, if
they provide any security at all [7]. Systems based on
signatures are vulnerable to targeted backdoors, where
an attacker is able to correctly sign a manipulated ver-
sion of the code. The manipulated version is only offered
selectively to the victim [13].
To prepare software for redistribution, modifications
and additions are often required as integration glue. The
attribution of these changes is important, because autho-
rizing a software for distribution constitutes a statement
of confidence into its benevolence.
Providing assurance of the mapping between source
code and binary code is being addressed in the Repro-
ducible Builds efforts [24]. Building on this property, a
secure software distribution can assure that for any bi-
nary the corresponding source code is guaranteed to be
available to assist audit and forensic activities.
In this paper, we develop and evaluate a system to
address these challenges for package managers. We pro-
pose that the software packagemeta data and source code
are submitted into an untrusted append-only Merkle tree
log. The design of the log allows third parties to effi-
ciently verify its honest operation. In detail, our contri-
butions are:
• Protection against targeted backdoors, including a
novel “hidden version” attack against existing soft-
ware transparency systems (Section 4)
• Auditability, providing the inspectable source code
corresponding to any installed binary and identify-
ing the authorizing maintainer (Section 5)
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• Practical protection against equivocation, reducing
inter-operator requirements (Section 6)
• Evaluation on over 3000 real Debian distribution
updates, demonstrating the viability of our system
and discovering a substantial number of bugs (Sec-
tion 7)
• Comparison to related work, highlighting the practi-
cability of our solution (Section 8)
We discuss Background in Section 2 and outline Related
Work in Section 3.
2 Background
In order to effectively secure the distribution process of
software it is necessary to understand how code is com-
monly redistributed. In this section we therefore describe
the architecture of the APT package manager.
2.1 Software distribution models
For many software projects, a dissemination model along
the following lines applies. Programmers, referred to as
“upstream” in our context, provide their software for
reuse. They upload the code to code hosting platforms,
such as Github, or programming language specific pack-
age managers. From there, software is downloaded by
distribution maintainers for packaging and integration.
This dissemination model is shown in Figure 1. Steps
marked with boxes regularly include transformations or
modifications, such as packaging or adding meta data.
The parts relevant to the distribution package manager
are shown below the dashed line.
Linux distributions, as an outcome of non-commercial
or commercial collaboration, have an important role in
the distribution of software. The core task of a distri-
bution is the integration work of making up to tens of
thousands of individual software projects co-installable
and standardizing interfaces for administration. After in-
tegrating a package, distributions regularly provide secu-
rity support for it. Other tasks of the distribution include
license vetting and quality assurance.
Distributions are therefore important parts of software
dissemination. Viewing the process of software distribu-
tion as a series of transformations, we can observe that it
would ideally be possible for the user to determine the
provenance of each piece of code in reverse direction
of the arrows in Figure 1. Each of the transformations
should be inspectable, by offering a machine readable de-
scription allowing to reproduce the transformation.
upstream programmer
code hosting platform
language specific
package manager
packaging and building
mirror network
Figure 1: Transformations of a software project.
2.2 Debian
Debian is one of the oldest Linux distributions, and con-
stitutes the basis for many derivative distributions [11].
In the following, we provide a simplified overview on
how packages are distributed with the APT packageman-
ager in Debian.
On a Debian machine, additional software can be in-
stalled by downloading and installing packages contain-
ing the libraries, executables and additional artifacts us-
ing the Advanced Package Tool (APT) package manager.
These packages are created by the maintainers of the
Debian distribution, who upload the signed packages to
a central server, the archive. This server coordinates the
building of binary packages for the supported CPU archi-
tectures. It serves the authoritative copy of the package
archive to the repository mirrors.
To decide no acceptance of a submitted package, the
archive verifies that its signature was created by an au-
thorized uploader key. This list of keys has the role of an
ACL, where some people may upload only specific pack-
ages, while others may be allowed to upload any pack-
age. There are other issues that may prevent acceptance
of the package, for example the license under which the
software is distributed. The package is then built for all
supported architectures. Information about the build envi-
ronment, captured in “buildinfo” files, is recorded by the
build servers [6, 25]. If building is successful, the pack-
age may be included into the upcoming release.
The binary and source packages are included into
a package index. These indices (“Packages” and
“Sources”) cover all package contents by their crypto-
graphic hash. They also contain meta data such as de-
pendencies. All indices are covered, again by hash, by
a release file which is signed. The release file is signed
by the publishing archive, constituting the main security
feature of plain APT. Indices, release file, and the pack-
ages themselves can now be released by the archive and
distributed to the global mirror network, which acts as
content distribution network. An APT client can retrieve
a package from a repository mirror server and verify its
authenticity by confirming its inclusion into the signed
release file. A release file has a wall clock validity time
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of two weeks.
3 Related work
We consider research on the security of package man-
agers and on Merkle tree-based log systems.
Security of package managers. Cappos et al. [7] an-
alyze the security of popular package managers, among
those APT. They define a threat model focused mainly
on adversarial control of a package mirror. Expanding
on this threat model, Samuel et al. consider compro-
mise of signing keys in the design of The Update Frame-
work (TUF), a secure application updater [30]. To guard
against key compromise, TUF introduces a number of
different roles in the update release process, each of
which operates cryptographic signing keys.
The following three properties are protected by TUF.
The content of updates is secured, meaning its integrity
is preserved. Securing the availability of updates protects
against freeze attacks, where an outdated version with
known vulnerabilities is served in place of a security up-
date. The goal of maintaining the correct combination of
updates implies the security of meta data.
An attack is deemed successful under the TUF threat
model in either of the following two cases. The client in-
stalls a different software than the most current version of
the software to be updated. An attack is also successful,
if the client does not install the most current version, but
perhaps leaves an older version installed, without caus-
ing an alert.
Later works focus on role separation and adoption to
domain specific threat models [17, 18].
Formal analysis of transparency logs. Dowling et
al. [12] as well as Chase and Meiklejohn [8] formally an-
alyze transparency logs. The model of Chase and Meik-
lejohn, the transparency overlay, includes equivocation.
They prove several cryptographic security properties for
this transparency, which can be instantiated to represent
Certificate Transparency as well as Bitcoin.
In a transparency overlay, the dynamic list commit-
ment (DLC) is defined as a commitment to a list of el-
ements that can represent exactly one list e.g., a Merkle
tree root. The list of elements can only be updated by
appending elements, producing a new commitment for
the new list. The commitments allows to efficiently prove
that the list has been operated append-only, and that an
element is part of the list. Notable properties include the
security of cryptographic evidence. For any kind of vio-
lation, there exists evidence provably identifying the cul-
pable party. This evidence is infeasible to fabricate.
The overlay extends an abstract system with the roles
of log, auditor, andmonitor. The log stores the events pro-
duced by the system, its DLC can be instantiated with
a Merkle tree. The auditor verifies consistency and in-
clusion of events without having to store the entire list
maintained by the log. The monitor retrieves elements
from the log, verifies log consistency, and analyses the
new events in order to flag any entries that are considered
problematic. By exchanging observed commitments, the
auditor and monitor can detect equivocation by the log.
Securing package updates with co-signing. Nikitin et
al. develop CHAINIAC, a system for software update
transparency [28]. Software developers create a Merkle
tree over a software package and the corresponding bina-
ries. This tree is then signed by the developer, constitut-
ing release approval. The signed trees are submitted to
co-signing witness servers.
The witnesses require a threshold of valid developer
signatures to accept a package for release. Additionally,
the mapping between source and binary is verified by
some of the witnesses. If these two checks succeed, the
release is accepted and collectively signed by the wit-
nesses.
The system allows to rotate developer keys and wit-
ness keys, while the root of trust is an offline key. It also
functions as a timestamping service, allowing for verifi-
cation of update timeliness.
Additionally to individual packages, releases of multi-
ple packages are also supported. These “snapshots” are
created by aggregating individual package skipchains.
Over the most recent versions of these, a Merkle tree is
constructed and signed by the witnesses.
Transparency systems. Certificate transparency (CT)
uses Merkle tree logs to provide a public view on all
certificates used in HTTPS [20, 21, 22, 23, 27]. Site
operators can observe certificates issued for their do-
mains and help detect misissuances. CT is widely de-
ployed and its use continues to expand. Basin et al. de-
velop ARPKI, an alternative public key infrastructure for
server certificates [5]. Domain owners choose two cer-
tification authorities and an integrity log server. The sys-
tem assumes that a number of public integrity log servers
exist. These are used to provide a globally consistent
view on all the certificates in existence. Fahl et al. sug-
gest a transparency model for Android applications, pro-
viding “Application Transparency” [13]. In order to se-
cure application updates, the hashes of these are submit-
ted into a transparency log system. Melara et al. apply
Merkle tree-based auditing to secure mobile messaging
in the Continuous identity and key management system
(CONIKS) [26]. The central premise of the approach is
that users are changing their keys frequently, and this pro-
cess must provide a smooth and secure user experience.
Keys are bound to identities by submitting them into the
audit log, which also serves as a public key directory.
3
archive-signed release file
meta data
maintainer-signed source packages
binary packages
log
submit
reproducible
Figure 2: System overview.
4 Design
We propose to extend the signature based APT by a
transparency system, adding on top of the existing secu-
rity mechanisms. This system is modeled after the trans-
parency overlay, where a log server maintains a Merkle
tree over a list of submitted items. The honest operation
of the log is verified by auditors and monitors. In our
case, the auditor is integrated into the APT client and the
monitor is a new standalone component.
4.1 Threat model
Additionally to existing Debian mechanisms, we intro-
duce a log server that maintains a Merkle tree as part of a
transparency overlay. The system consists of the follow-
ing components. Individual maintainers upload signed
source packages to the archive. The archive compiles and
distributes binary packages, submitting releases into the
log.
Compromise of components and collusion of partici-
pants must not result in a violation of the following secu-
rity goals remaining undetected. A goal of our system
is to make it infeasible for the attacker to deliver tar-
geted backdoors. For every binary, the system can pro-
duce the corresponding source code and the authorizing
maintainer. Defined irregularities, such as a failure to cor-
rectly increment version numbers, also can be detected
by the system.
4.2 Release log
The APT release file identifies, by cryptographic hash,
the packages, sources, and meta data which includes de-
pendencies. This release file, meta data, and source pack-
ages are submitted to a log server operating an append-
only Merkle tree, as shown in Figure 2. The log adds a
new leaf for each file.
We assume maintainers may only upload signed
source packages to the archive, not binary packages. The
archive submits source packages to one or more log
servers. We further assume that the buildinfo files captur-
ing the build environment are signed and are made public,
e.g. by them being covered by the release file, together
with other meta data.
In order to make the maintainers uploading a package
accountable, a source package containing all maintainer
keys is created and submitted into the archive. This con-
stitutes the declaration by the archive, that these keys
were authorized to upload for this release. The key ring is
required to be append-only, where keys are marked with
an expiry date instead of being removed. This allows ver-
ification of source packages submitted long ago, using
the keys valid at the respective point in time.
At release time, meta data and release file are sub-
mitted into the log as well. The log server produces a
commitment for each submission, which constitutes its
promise to include the submitted item into a future ver-
sion of the tree. The log only accepts authenticated sub-
missions from the archive. The commitment includes a
timestamp, hash of the release file, log identifier and
the log’s signature over these. The archive should then
verify that the log has produced a signed tree root that
resolves the commitment. To complete the release, the
archive publishes the commitments together with the up-
dates. Clients can then proceed with the verification of
the release file.
The log regularly produces signed Merkle tree roots
after receiving a valid inclusion request. The signed tree
root produced by the log includes the Merkle tree hash,
tree size, timestamp, log identifier, and the log’s signa-
ture.
On the client side, the release file will be retrieved as
usual. Given the release file and inclusion commitment,
the client can verify by hashing that the commitment be-
longs to this release file and also verify the signature. The
client can now query the log, demanding a current tree
root and an inclusion proof for this release file. Per stan-
dard Merkle tree proofs [8, 10, 20], the inclusion proof
consists of a list of hashes to recompute the received root
hash. For the received tree root, a consistency proof is de-
manded to a previous known tree root. The consistency
proof is again a list of hashes. For the two given tree
roots, it shows that the log only added items between
them. Clients store the signed tree root for the largest tree
they have seen, to be used in any later consistency proofs.
Set aside split view attacks, which will be discussed later,
clients verifying the log inclusion of the release file will
detect targeted modifications of the release.
The procedures described do not add any tasks for an
ordinary user of APT, or for a maintainer. One further
consideration is the availability of the log. To improve
log availability, elements can be submitted into multiple
logs. Clients would then contact all of these to validate a
release, and require a quorum.
4.3 Removal of elements
Source packages sometimes must be removed from the
archive. The reason is usually that the distribution license
for a particular file in the package is not acceptable under
the project’s guidelines. The offending packages are then
removed from the archive, and a new version of the pack-
age is prepared, fixing the issues.
Since the log must be append-only, and also provide
the source code for all packages, this legal requirement
cannot be fulfilled directly. In order to perform the re-
moval, a removal notice is submitted to the log. It con-
sists of a statement signed by the archive, specifying
which source package was removed, the time and reason
of removal. It will be returned in response to requests for
the original source.
4.4 Hidden versions
The hidden version attack attempts to hide a targeted
backdoor by following correct signing and log submis-
sion procedures. It may require collusion by the archive
and an authorized maintainer. The attacker prepares tar-
geted malicious update to a package, say version v1.2.1,
and a clean update v1.3.0. The archive presents the mali-
cious package only to the victimwhen it wishes to update.
The clean version v.1.3.0 will be presented to everybody
immediately afterwards.
A non-targeted user is unlikely to ever observe the
backdoored version, thereby drawing a minimal amount
of attention to it. The attack however leaves an audit trail
in the log, so the update itself can be detected by audit-
ing.
A package maintainer monitoring uploads for their
packages using the log would notice an additional ver-
sion being published. A malicious package maintainer
would however not alert the public when this happens.
This could be construed as a targeted backdoor in viola-
tion of the stated security goals.
To mitigate this problem a minimum time between
package updates can be introduced. This can be achieved
by a fixing the issuance of release files and their log sub-
mission to a static frequency, or by alerting on quick sub-
sequent updates to one package.
In the hidden version attack, the attacker increases a
version number in order to get the victim to update a
package. The victim will install this backdoored update.
The monitor detects the hidden version attack due to
the irregular release file publication. There are now two
cases to be considered. The backdoor may be in the bi-
nary package, or it may be in the source package.
The first case will be detected by monitors verifying
the reproducible builds property. A monitor can rebuild
all changed source packages on every update and check
if the resulting binary matches. If not, the blame falls
clearly on the archive, because the source does not cor-
respond to the binary, which can be demonstrated by ex-
ploiting reproducible builds.
The second case requires investigation of the packages
modified by the update. The source code modifications
can be investigated for the changed packages, because all
source code is logged. The fact that source code can be
analyzed, and no analysis on binaries is required, makes
the investigation of the hidden version alert simpler. The
blame for this case falls on the maintainer, who can be
identified by their signature on the source package. If
the upload was signed by a key not in the allowed set,
the blame falls on the archive for failing to authorize cor-
rectly.
If the package version numbers in the meta data are in-
consistent, this constitutes a misbehavior by the submit-
ting archive. It can easily be detected by a monitor. Us-
ing the release file the monitor can also easily ensure, by
demanding inclusion proofs, that all required files have
been logged.
5 Log validation
Monitors are a required component to ensure the log op-
erates correctly as well as a building block against equiv-
ocation. Monitors communicate with the log, verifying
consistency. In case of misbehavior, a monitor would
raise an alert and provide the cryptographic proof that
comes with it. Many monitors can observe one log.
Monitors retrieve all additions into the log, allow-
ing them to execute custom investigation functions on
the logged items. The consistency of the log is always
checked before the items are processed for flagging.
Each monitor can have different investigation rules, or
none at all, in which case it only monitors the append-
only operation of the log.
5.1 Log monitoring functions
The primary function of a monitor is to ensure that the
log server maintains its list of items by only appending
items. The monitor initializes by retrieving all items from
the log server, as well as the signed tree root. Themonitor
verifies the correctness of the tree root by recomputing
the hash tree and verifying the signature.
It will now continuously poll the log server if a new
tree root is available. Should a new tree root be published,
the monitor retrieves the tree root and all items that were
added since the previous tree root the monitor had ob-
served. The monitor can now recompute the new hash
tree in order to verify the tree root signed by the log.
In this approach, the monitor stores all the items in the
list maintained by the log. It will also observe any new
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items. It is therefore possible for the log to investigate all
items and raise alerts based on the findings.
5.2 Monitor examination of events
Additionally to their fundamental task in keeping the log
honest, the monitors can fulfill additional roles by investi-
gating the items kept in the log. In the following, several
such functions are described.
For each of these, we will assume that the monitor
continuously updates its view of the log by retrieving
any new items the log has added. Before calling the in-
vestigating functions, the list of new items is filtered. In
general, we are only interested in release files. The signa-
ture on the release file is verified. The functions are then
called for each of the items remaining after filtering and
verification. We will also assume that the investigating
functions have access to the log content. They need to be
able to determine if an element is part of the log, identify
the preceding release file and parse it.
5.2.1 Release file consistency
A basic check that requires a monitor is to verify the con-
sistency of the release file. This check ensures that the
archive submitted a consistent meta data state into the
log.
Completeness(releaseFile):
1 if not verifySignature(releaseFile):
2 alert releaseFile
// indices (Packages, Sources) logged
3 for indexFile in releaseFile:
4 if not isInLog(indexFile):
5 alert indexFile
// source packages logged
6 for sourcesFile in releaseFile.sourcesFiles:
7 for sourcePkg in sourcesFile:
8 if not isInLog(sourcePkg):
9 alert sourcePkg
10 return
Algorithm 1: Verify elements covered by a release file
are logged.
The first process is Algorithm 1. The following verifi-
cations are executed for each new release file added to the
log. For each Sources and Packages file, their presence in
the log, with matching hash, must be ensured. For every
Sources file, all listed source packages must be in the log
with a matching hash.
Each binary package, as enforced by Algorithm 2,
must come with a corresponding source package. This
SourceAvailable(releaseFile):
1 sourcesFiles ← releaseFile.sourcesFiles
2 for packagesFile in releaseFile.packagesFiles:
3 for package in PackagesFile:
// no source available
4 if not sourcePresent(package, sourcesFiles):
5 alert package, sourcesFiles
6 return
Algorithm 2: Verify that all sources are available.
VersionConsistency(releaseFile):
1 sourcesFiles ← releaseFile.sourcesFiles
2 for packagesFile in releaseFile.packagesFiles:
3 for package in PackagesFile:
// compare with previous release file
4 if not metaChanged(package):
5 continue
6 if not versionIncremented(package):
7 alert package
8 source ← getSource(package, sourcesFiles)
9 if not metaChanged(source) and
10 not buildinfoChanged(package):
11 alert package, source
12 for sourcesFile in sourcesFiles:
13 for source in sourcesFile:
14 if not metaChanged(source):
15 continue
16 if not versionIncremented(source):
17 alert source
18 return
Algorithm 3: Verify version consistency of the release
file.
is necessary in itself and also for later checks such as
reproducibility.
We enforce version bumps for modified packages by
comparing the meta data fields of all source and binary
packages. The meta data contains in particular the hash,
version number, and dependencies. If this is not enforced,
a client might see and install a new package with differ-
ent meta data than others.
For this purpose, the monitor maintains several data
items associated with the package name. Out of the Pack-
ages and Sources files, the package versions and meta
data block are extracted. The meta data contains in par-
ticular the package hash and its dependencies.
For the given package names, the entire entry with
meta data and hash of the package is compared for equal-
ity to the stored one. In case of changes, the local package
entry is updated and the configured notification actions
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taken. If a change in meta data is detected in Algorithm 3,
the version number must be incremented as well.
Monitors may provide analysis functions additional to
those discussed so far. In such a case, the monitor should
meet the checks of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3. These ensure
that the meta data covered and provided by the release
file is in a sane state and fit for further analysis.
5.2.2 Frequency
Another monitor function is to observe the frequency in
which release files are produced and made available. The
monitor needs to closely follow the log and know the
expected release schedules. The monitor will produce an
alert when an irregular release interval occurs.
This mechanism enables investigators to focus atten-
tion on possible misbehavior. There should also be an
alert, if the archive stops publishing releases unexpect-
edly. This process is asynchronous and runs continu-
ously.
If an alert occurs, the monitor also has the necessary
tools to help investigation. As it has all source packages
available, it can produce the difference in source code
compared to the last release. The signatures on the source
packages identify the maintainers involved. If the signa-
ture was produced by a valid key, the maintainer is re-
sponsible for any issues the source code exhibits. In case
the signature is invalid, the archive has allowed violation
of the submission access control.
5.2.3 Package maintainers
To verify the adherence of the archive to the package up-
load ACL, all source packages that were changed in a re-
lease file are investigated. A package is also investigated
if its meta data or buildinfo files changed.
For the updated packages, if any of the signatures can-
not be verified as having been created by a valid main-
tainer key, an alarm is raised. Not all uploaders may up-
date every package. In the policy map of signing keys
acceptable for each package, keys of full members are
added to every package, other uploader keys are added
to their respective packages.
Additionally to this generic check, individual main-
tainers of packages might want to see which of their
packages were updated, and by whom. After submission,
maintainers keep track if their package was published.
They should also observe if a new upload signing key
is published under their name. The maintainers of the up-
load ACL should also keep track of the keys published
by the archive.
5.2.4 Reproducible builds
For every package that changes, a monitor can verify
the reproducible build property. This check is important
to make sure that the archive publishes the software in-
tended by the maintainer, shown in Algorithm 4. If the
relationship between source and binary is not verified,
the archive could build backdoors into binaries, where
the backdoors are not reflected in the source code.
Reproducible(releaseFile):
1 for package in releaseFile.allpackages:
2 if metaChanged(package):
// rebuild for all architectures and compare
3 correct ← isRepro(package, releaseFile)
4 if not correct:
5 alert package
6 return
Algorithm 4: Verify transformation from source to bi-
nary.
Given a new release file, the monitor would deter-
mine all modified source packages by comparing the new
Sources file to the previous one. All changed packages
are now rebuilt. The hashes of the binary packages must
match the hashes provided in the Packages files. If any
mismatches occur, an alarm is raised. The blame falls
on the archive, which has published a non-reproducible
package, possibly including a backdoor.
6 Equivocation
The most significant attack by the log or with the collu-
sion of the log is equivocation. In a split-view or equivo-
cation attack, a malicious log presents different versions
of the Merkle tree to the victim and to everybody else.
Each tree version is kept consistent in itself. The tree pre-
sented to the victim will include a leaf that is malicious
in some way, such as an update with a backdoor. It might
also omit a leaf in order to hide an update. This is a pow-
erful attack within the threat model that violates the se-
curity goals and must therefore be defended. A defense
against this attack requires the client to learn if they are
served from the same tree as the others.
In some log systems equivocation is addressed with
gossiping, or with monitors and auditors [8, 9, 10, 29].
The auditor, as a functionality embedded with the client,
exchanges tree roots with the monitor. They request con-
sistency proofs between their own observed tree root and
the tree root of the other party. Both are then able to no-
tice if the log presents a different view to the other party,
detecting equivocation. Because the tree roots are signed,
the log can be attributed as the malicious party.
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To some extent, we envision that monitors are run
much like packagemirrors are today. Some organizations
may donate their resources for the public good, others
may opt to just improve their own operations. To pro-
vide clients with a monitor after a new installation, a list
of trustworthy monitors would need to exist. For the dis-
tribution to be confident in their reliability, it ultimately
would need to run them. This runs contrary to the moni-
tor’s task of holding the distribution accountable. It begs
the question how a meaningful trust boundary can be
drawn through the distribution infrastructure. We con-
clude that auditor-monitor communication is not suffi-
cient to address equivocation in our case.
Log operations can be done on multiple logs e.g., by
submitting everything into two logs. While this does help
with equivocation in principle, the logs are in our sce-
nario operated by the same group. It is therefore prudent
to assume that if one of these is compromised, the second
one would also be.
This approach can be used for redundancy, where a
quorum of logs are queried and must provide the ex-
pected answer. If one log fails or must be taken offline
after misbehaving, the clients could still be satisfied with
responses of the other logs.
6.1 Design for tree root cross logging
There is limited advantage to using multiple logs by the
same operator. Defenses against equivocation are closely
related to operator diversity. To extend the pool of eligi-
ble secondary log operators, interoperation between logs
of different organizations or even domains is required. To
make this interoperation realistic, the interface should be
small and simple, which we will strive for in the follow-
ing.
One approach for detecting equivocation is logging
of tree roots between cooperating logs. This approach
requires multiple log servers. We now assume different
logs exist, run by different operators. These could be
other Linux distributions, or possibly a Certificate Trans-
parency log made compatible.
Consider one log accepting new list items, for now
dubbed the committing log. This log regularly creates
a new signed tree root on inclusion of list items. This
log will now submit this tree root, when it is created in
response to a new release file, into another log, the wit-
nessing log. Additionally to performing its native tasks,
the witnessing log accepts the submitted tree root as a
new list element and includes it into its Merkle tree. The
inclusion commitment retained from the witnessing log,
as well as the submitted tree root, will be provided to the
archive by the committing log.
This relationship is shown in Figure 3. The upper row
shows one log of list size three adding a fourth element.
1. a) 1. b)
2.
Figure 3: Tree root cross logging.
The lower row shows a different log. The log with three
elements in situation 1a adds an element in step 1b, re-
sulting in a new tree root. It then submits this tree root
in step 2 as element for log inclusion to the lower log.
The lower log accepts this new element into its list. By
publishing the tree root into the witnessing log, the pri-
mary log publicly commits to a history of its tree. This
commitment can be used to detect equivocation through
monitoring of the witnessing log.
When the client now verifies a log entry with the com-
mitting log, it also has to verify that a tree root covering
this entry was submitted into the witnessing log. Addi-
tionally, the client verifies the append-only property of
the witnessing log.
The witnessing log introduces additional monitor-
ing requirements. Next to the usual monitoring of the
append-only operation, we need to check that no equiv-
ocating tree roots are included. To this end, a monitor
follows all new log entries of the witnessing log that are
tree roots of the committing log. Themonitor verifies that
they are all valid extensions of the committing log’s tree
history.
By using tree roots as a generic interoperability layer
between logs, cooperation between different operators
and domains is enabled. Each log only needs to add one
new leaf type in order to participate. This is easier to
achieve than, for example, making a CT log compliant
with all the requirements for software transparency log-
ging.
6.2 Auditor
To contribute to the security provided by root cross log-
ging, an auditor component needs to contact the second
log. The auditor verifies that its own view on the log is
committed to the witnessing log. It validates the correct
operation of this second log with the established proof
mechanisms.
The committing log, denoted as log A here, has sub-
mitted a tree root into the witnessing log, log B. The audi-
tor is now assumed to be provisioned by the archive with
this tree root and the corresponding inclusion promise
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from log B. An element, in our case the release file, is ver-
ified by requesting an inclusion proof for it from log A.
The inclusion proof is requested specifically for the tree
size of the root given by the archive, ensuring that it actu-
ally covers this element. The auditor then requests a con-
sistency proof from that tree root to a previous known
tree root. After verifying the two proofs, we have now es-
tablished that log A has submitted a tree root into log B
and that this tree root is consistent with the auditor’s view
on the tree.
We proceed to verify inclusion into the witnessing log.
Using the knowledge of the committed tree root and the
inclusion promise by the witnessing log, we can request
an inclusion proof from the witnessing log. For the tree
root returned with that inclusion proof and a previous
known tree root, we request a consistency proof from the
witnessing log.
The auditor has now established that log A has pre-
sented the same log view to the auditor and to log B.
Crucially, the auditor can not be certain that its view is
the only one that log A has committed into log B. To en-
sure that, every element in log B must be inspected. This
task naturally falls to a monitor, which is discussed next.
6.3 Monitor
The task of the monitor in cross logging is to make sure
that one log only commits to one view. This requires the
monitor to keep track of both the committing and the wit-
nessing log. It monitors the committing log, log A. For
simplicity, we assume that the monitoring process con-
sists of downloading and storing all new log elements,
and verifying signed tree roots. The knowledge of log A
fixes the monitor’s view on the log and enables it to gener-
ate tree roots for all tree sizes. This is the usual procedure
for monitoring.
Extending this, the monitor will also monitor the wit-
nessing log B. In the following, all list elements of log B
are investigated.We are interested in all elements that are
tree roots of log A, so we filter for these.
For each of these elements, first the signature is ver-
ified. In a second step, the Merkle tree root in this ele-
ment is recomputed using the knowledge of the elements
of log A. The computed tree root is compared to the ele-
ment in log B. If these checks succeed, the element cor-
responds to the view on log A that the monitor has.
If the verification procedure succeeds for all elements
that are signed tree roots of log A, then the monitor has
established that log A has only ever committed one view
to its witness log B. Should a tree root not correspond
to the known list of elements of log A, equivocation has
been detected.
If log B is dishonest, it cannot frame log A, because
tree roots are signed. Log B also cannot omit elements.
Log A has obtained inclusion promises from log B, en-
abling it to demonstrate that a given tree root was sub-
mitted into log B. If both logs collude in equivocation,
no security can be achieved in this system.
6.4 Security
The approach presented in this paper protects the clients
directly that additionally check the witnessing log, if the
logs do not collude. If the committing and witnessing
logs do not collude, the committing log will be unable
to observe that the client verifies its honesty by querying
the witnessing log. It is therefore unable to distinguish
between clients that do this additional check and those
that do not. This results in herd immunity for clients that
do not check the witnessing log, provided that a propor-
tion of clients actually does this check. In any case, it is
necessary that some of the clients of the committing log
verify the witnessing log.
The more logs participate by including the tree roots
of the other logs, the harder attacks become. One honest
log is enough to detect equivocation. For package authen-
tication, each distribution could run one or two logs, all
of which cooperate by tree root logging. To mitigate the
risk of collusion, multiple logs run by different operators
are required.
7 Evaluation
In the following, we will informally analyze the security
properties of the main design. We further implement the
system and feed it two years worth of distribution up-
dates, noting performance characteristics and detected ir-
regularities.
7.1 Software transparency as a secure
pledged transparency overlay
We claim that our log design described previously im-
plements a secure transparency overlay as proposed and
proven by Chase and Meiklejohn [8]. This constitutes
our primary security argument, extended in separate ar-
guments by monitoring functions and protection against
equivocation.
In the following we show how a secure overlay is
instantiated from the proposed software transparency
mechanism. In the parlance of the secure overlay, the log,
monitor, and auditor are part of the “overlay”. The “sys-
tem” is an existing infrastructure to be secured with the
transparency overlay. In our case, the system is the soft-
ware distribution via the archive and the APT client.
Theorem 1. Software transparency is a secure pledged
transparency overlay.
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Proof. We use the method of Chase and Meiklejohn to
instantiate the secure pledged transparency overlay. Two
parts need to be demonstrated. First, the function creating
the system events (GenEventSet) needs to be instanti-
ated. Second, we need to define for all transparency over-
lay protocols which parts of the software transparency
system interact with them, namely for the Log and
CheckEntry protocols. The Log protocol defines sub-
mission of events into the log. In the CheckEntry pro-
tocol, the system interacts with the auditor component
of the transparency overlay. The auditor in turn verifies
log inclusion and log consistency, given an event and a
corresponding inclusion promise of the log.
GenEventSet. Elements are solely generated by
the archive. They can be source package files, meta data
files, and signed release files.
Log protocol. In the Log protocol, elements are
submitted to the log. The archive is the sole originator of
events and submits these to the log.
CheckEntry protocol. We designate this part of
the system to be the APT client, making the auditor ef-
fectively part of the APT client.
We note that a release is now produced jointly by the
archive and the log, not just the archive anymore. The
client is now able to verify the transparency property on
release files.
The functions of the log, the auditor and monitor are
implemented as prescribed by the overlay. We conclude
that the proposed software transparency mechanism con-
stitutes a secure transparency overlay. This allows the
system to build on proven security properties.
Detection of targeted backdoors. Using the secure
overlay, we will demonstrate that our system detects tar-
geted backdoors, achieved by tailored monitor services.
Assume a malicious or compromised maintainer inserts
a backdoor into a source package. In order to be accepted
into the archive, it must be signed by their key. Should the
archive not enforce this, a monitor verifying maintainer
signatures would notice and alert. It can therefore be at-
tributed to the maintainer and the source code is present
for analysis. Amaintainer cannot upload binary packages
without help by the archive, because we assume only
source uploads are allowed.
If the archive modifies a source package, this package
lacks a valid maintainer signature. This is detected by a
monitor validating the maintainer signatures and upload
policy. If the archive modifies a binary package without
modifying the corresponding source, this is detected by a
monitor verifying the reproducible builds property. Mod-
ifications by the log are discovered, because the release
file signed by the archive covers all other files.
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Figure 4: Auditor traffic to the log.
7.2 Performance
Our system uses the Trillian generic Merkle tree imple-
mentation [15] which is also employed in some CT logs.
We implement our log functionality using this hash tree.
The log offers an HTTPS interface for JSON objects for
element submission and the auditor and monitor func-
tionality. The log is instantiated with the SHA256 hash
function and the ECDSA-P256 signature scheme.
Starting at the inception of the Debian “stretch” re-
lease, we replay two years of Debian updates. The his-
toric updates are retrieved from the snapshot.debian.org
service before the experiment. This results in 3010 re-
lease files, starting on 2015-04-25 and ending on 2017-
06-17. The “stretch” release is, at that point in time, a
rolling release. As such it experiences much more up-
dates than a final release that only gets updates for se-
curity support.
In our measurement setup, the log resides on a differ-
ent machine than the submission component, auditor, and
monitor. The network communication with the log con-
sists of HTTPS requests. For each of the release files, we
first submit the release meta data and source packages
into the log and then run the auditor afterwards. Given
the inclusion promise for the release file, the auditor val-
idates the log operation. It retrieves an inclusion and a
consistency proof with GET requests from the log and
verifies these. After all releases are logged and validated,
the monitor fetches the log elements using GET requests
and executes its verification functions.
We observe that the duration of the log submissions
is dominated, by several orders of magnitude, the trans-
fer duration incurred by submitting source packages. As
the auditor runs on every client, its performance is most
critical. In terms of computation, only some signature
verifications and hash computations are added. Next, we
measure the network layer PDU traffic between auditor
and log, using the Linux net_cls cgroups and netfilter.
The data in Figure 4 shows the traffic caused by inclu-
sion proofs and consistency proofs during auditor oper-
ation. The request for the inclusion proof requires send-
ing 1.3 kB and receiving 2.9 kB on average. The consis-
tency proof is requested for the tree size of the previ-
ous release file. The consistency proof requires receiv-
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Figure 5: Disk usage of the log server.
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Figure 6: Processing time for monitor functions.
ing slightly less data, on average 2.6 kB. Note that these
numbers include the TLS handshake.
One optimization that can be done for the client is to
deliver the commonly required proofs over the mirror in-
stead of contacting the log separately. There need to be
several generations of consistency proofs on the mirror,
in order to support clients that do not retrieve every new
release. For 28 generations of release files covering one
week, the consistency proofs require about 18 kB. This
method scales linearly in storage size per generation.
On the log side, the disk usage grows with the submit-
ted elements. The graphs in Figure 5 show the occupied
storage against the tree size. After two years, with around
270 000 elements logged, the database uses 443MB and
the package contents occupy an additional 396GB.
Themonitor operates asynchronously, but should issue
alerts timely. The processing time of the different mon-
itor functions implemented is shown in Figure 6. Pars-
ing the release file and meta data takes about 20 seconds.
Checking if all files are logged takes over 80 seconds, as
the process accesses all files logged for the release and
compares the cryptographic hash. The version compari-
son and check for presence of a source package are then
negligible.
We conclude that the performance of all measured
functions is sufficient for actual use. Even smaller
projects should be capable of running a log server log-
ging source packages.
7.3 Detected irregularities
The task of the monitor is to flag suspicious elements in
the log and raise alerts. We now discuss anomalies dis-
covered by our monitor functions when applied to the
historic data.
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As shown in Figure 7, there are continuously sev-
eral hundred binary packages for which there is no
corresponding source package in the release. Note that
this function counts packages multiple times when the
source is not identified for multiple architectures. Start-
ing March 2017, there is a large number of sources miss-
ing, indicating an error which was fixed in May 2017.
Comparison of version numbers was implemented us-
ing the Python apt_pkg library, which implements the
non-trivial versioning rules used in APT. For the com-
parison of package meta data to detect if a package was
changed we filter non-critical fields such as tags. Note
that the meta data includes a hash over the package con-
tents. Whenever the meta data changes, we expect a ver-
sion increase. All CPU architectures in the release are
counted. We show a many version increments are miss-
ing in a release in Figure 8. There are 1717 releases
without unexpected events. Some releases have a few
inconsistencies in version increments, and a number of
releases have thousands. The results for source and bi-
nary packages look similar in the plot, but differ slightly.
There are a substantial number of changes in the pack-
age meta data without version increment, suggesting that
meta data changes are regularly done without increment-
ing the version.
One source package that existed in the release meta
data was missing in all releases, because it had been re-
moved administratively from the snapshot.debian.org ser-
vice. There were no files where the hash was indicated
incorrectly by the meta data.
We discovered a considerable amount of anomalies in
two years worth of updates. Our system would have dis-
covered them automatically shortly after their release and
raised an alarm. The result suggests that the release pro-
cess must become more stringent in order to allow such
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irregularities to be the cause of security alerts.
8 Comparison to related work
CHAINIAC [28] is a software update transparency sys-
tem. Clients can verify they were presented with a recent
software version using timestamping by the witnesses.
The witnesses also serve the function of assuring global
consistency by providing a collective signature. The re-
lease history is fixed as immutable by inclusion of his-
toric hashes. In our proposed architecture, timeliness is
assured by a wall clock validity period embedded in the
release file. Global consistency and immutability is pro-
vided by submitting releases to the log server. The correct
operation of the log is ensured by auditors and monitors.
The build verifiers in CHAINIAC can be compared
to monitors running our reproducible builds verification
algorithm. In contrast to the build verifier, the monitor
operates asynchronously. This means that the build veri-
fier will detect and effectively stop distribution of a non-
reproducible package. It also results in the system hav-
ing to wait for enough build verifiers to complete the
build process for all supported instruction set architec-
tures. The monitor does not delay an update because a
package builds slowly, leading to a faster release com-
pared to CHAINIAC.
In CHAINIAC, all code submissions must be con-
firmed by other developers through cryptographic signa-
tures. The proposed architecture does not include a code
review functionality, but rather supposes a mapping of
expected developers to projects, verified by monitors. In
particular, the maintainers of the distribution’s upload
policy have an incentive to monitor this activity and alert
the wider project in case of irregularities.
The collective authority consisting of independently
operated witnesses provides collective signatures, where
some of the witnesses may be compromised. The pro-
posed architecture, on the other hand, relies on a single
log or quorum of logs. This is justified by two reasons.
First, the logs require substantial disk space to store all
versions of all source packages ever submitted. A log
therefore need not only resources to operate the tree,
but also secondary storage, over time in the order of ter-
abytes, which the generic witness servers might be un-
willing to provide. Second, it is unclear who would op-
erate the independent witness servers for Linux distribu-
tions. To achieve protection against equivocation, we ad-
vocate for the simple interface provided by tree root cross
logging between different logs.
The CHAINIAC model does provide accountability,
but does not offer the same forensic assurances. In our
proposed architecture, investigators are guaranteed an au-
dit trail of who made changes and the changes in source
form. This guarantee is provided by the log, the opera-
tions of which are verified by monitors.
In conclusion, our proposed system follows an “un-
trusted but trustworthy” model, doing validity checks
only after a release. This allows the system to reflect
operational reality by exploiting the incentives of differ-
ent roles in the project. Protection against equivocation
is achieved by allowing independent organizations to in-
teroperate easily to their mutual benefit.
Parts of the system were proposed previously by the
authors [2]. In comparison, it is now extended with au-
ditability, protection against equivocation, and evaluated
on actual distribution updates.
9 Conclusion
We propose a software transparency system for the popu-
lar Linux package manager APT. The system detects tar-
geted backdoors and offers several forensic guarantees,
such as the availability of auditable source code for ev-
ery installed binary.
To detect equivocation in log systems, we propose tree
root cross logging. This allows logs of different operators
and types to interoperate, requiring only a small inter-
face.
An evaluation of the system on two years worth of ac-
tual distribution updates identifies numerous anomalies,
for instance missing source code. Our system would have
identified and allowed fixing these issues.
By tracking code and maintainer attribution, software
transparency can offer a building block for future sys-
tems to securely track the provenance of code through
various redistribution steps.
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